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TAMING IMMIGRATION: THE 64TH HENRY J. 
MILLER DISTINGUISHED LECTURE SERIES 
REMARKS 
David A. Martin* 
Migration has always been a feature of human existence. Today it 
is a hot political topic—the source of much benefit to receiving nations 
and to the migrants themselves but also a chronic source of tension and 
conflict. I will speak today about the acute need for taming 
immigration and about ways to reach that goal. And I express my 
thanks to the Georgia State University College of Law and to those 
who established the Henry J. Miller Distinguished Lecture Series for 
this opportunity. 
I.   Setting the Stage 
First, some preliminaries: why “taming”? The title of my Lecture 
has evoked disparate responses from people who have heard a preview. 
Some worried that this notion means radical cutbacks or harsh 
enforcement measures. I should talk instead, they suggested, about 
protecting immigrants or expanding immigration. Others thought that 
mere taming is either too weak or insufficiently ambitious in a time 
when control systems have suffered major breakdowns. 
To unpack this contrast, let’s start by examining what people might 
mean, in light of recent history, when they consider the concept of 
untamed migration. In 2015, the notion probably would have conjured 
images of flimsy rafts on a stormy sea between Turkey and nearby 
Greek islands—Syrians who had fled a vicious civil war, now exiting 
Turkey in huge numbers and trying to reach Greece as the gateway to 
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asylum in Europe.1 The voyage was relatively short but quite 
hazardous. Many died. You probably remember a  photo of a drowned 
child named Alan Kurdi, facedown on the Turkish sand—graphic, 
painful, heartbreaking. 
Our hemisphere produces similar scenes of untamed migration. 
Southern Mexico has seen migrant caravans—hundreds of people 
together, many on foot, heading eventually for the U.S. border. The 
travelers were overwhelmingly from Guatemala, Honduras, and El 
Salvador. Their determined movement provoked heated comments 
about “invasion” from President Trump during the congressional 
election season of 2018.2 
Neither the Syrians nor the Central Americans had visas. To call 
their migration untamed is not necessarily to disparage the reasons 
these people migrated, whether or not they ultimately have a basis for 
permanent relocation. Instead the label recognizes dangers to the 
participants, as well as potential alarm and backlash from the citizens 
of the receiving state, because of the high volume and the unruly 
arrival, without advance permission. 
Now to shift the focus. What about the idea of taming immigration? 
At one pole might be the scenes of crying children from Guatemala or 
Honduras in crude rooms of concrete and steel and chain-link fencing 
in mid-2018. During those months, such children, even toddlers, were 
routinely separated from their families and detained by U.S. authorities 
while the parents were criminally prosecuted.3 The practice was 
expressly intended by several officials in the Trump Administration to 
assert control by deterring further migration of families seeking 
                                                                                                             
 1. See Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan & Susan Fratzke, Europe’s Migration Crisis in Context: Why Now 
and What Next?, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Sept. 24, 2015), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/europe%E2%80%99s-migration-crisis-context-why-now-and-
what-next [https://perma.cc/DT48-86EB]; Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Migration Crisis Tests European 
Consensus and Governance, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Dec. 18, 2015), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/migration-crisis-tests-european-consensus-and-governance 
[https://perma.cc/4JCV-5QHN]. 
 2. Jordan Fabian, Trump: Migrant Caravan ‘Is an Invasion,’ HILL (Oct. 29, 2018, 11:08 AM), 
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/413624-trump-calls-migrant-caravan-an-invasion 
[https://perma.cc/KX3R-8XML]; Migrant Caravan: What Is It and Why Does It Matter?, BBC (Nov. 26, 
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-45951782 [https://perma.cc/C7BL-JTCJ]. 
 3. JULIE HIRSCHFELD DAVIS & MICHAEL D. SHEAR, BORDER WARS: INSIDE TRUMP’S ASSAULT ON 
IMMIGRATION 252–68 (2019). 
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asylum.4 That policy evoked an overwhelmingly negative public 
reaction. President Trump—uncharacteristically—backtracked, 
rescinding the separation policy.5 But inexcusably casual government 
record-keeping hindered reunification of families. 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel implemented, in August 2015, 
a sharply different notion of taming from that of President Trump in 
response to the perilous maritime flow of Syrians to Greece. Just a few 
days after the Alan Kurdi photo appeared on front pages around the 
world,6 she directed that refugees would be accepted in Germany 
without regard to the tight constraints of the Dublin Regulation,7 and 
she urged other European Union (EU) countries to open their doors. 
At first this courageous humanitarian stand drew praise and seemed to 
go well.8 German citizens staged public rallies in support, and Merkel 
received warm welcomes when she visited refugee hostels. 
But that public reaction did not endure. The numbers were huge, a 
million arrivals in one year to Germany alone, and insufficient thought 
was given to how the people landing in Greece would actually reach 
Germany or other potential asylum countries.9 For several weeks, the 
arrivals simply started walking north, producing a different kind of 
dramatic photo—enormous columns of pedestrians trudging across 
open fields in Slovenia or clogging superhighways in Hungary.10 
                                                                                                             
 4. Id. at 253–54, 260, 270. 
 5. Id. at 277–79. 
 6. The Makings of Merkel’s Decision to Accept Refugees, SPIEGEL INT’L (Aug. 24, 2016, 1:59 PM), 
https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/a-look-back-at-the-refugee-crisis-one-year-later-a-
1107986.html. 
 7. For a general description of the Dublin Regulation and its relevance to the European refugee crisis 
of the last five years, see Patrick J. Lyons, Explaining the Rules for Migrants: Borders and Asylum, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/17/world/europe/europe-refugees-migrants-
rules.html?auth=login-email&login=email [https://perma.cc/E6W6-PZ8B]. The Dublin rules, adopted by 
the European Union, generally provide that the responsibility for judging asylum claims falls upon the 
state of first arrival, which must keep the asylum seeker on its territory during that adjudication. Id.; The 
Makings of Merkel’s Decision to Accept Refugees, supra note 6. 
 8. Melissa Eddy, As Germany Welcomes Migrants, Some Wonder How to Make Acceptance Last, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/06/world/europe/germany-welcomes-
migrants-and-refugees.html [https://perma.cc/8F25-KLD5]. 
 9. See David A. Martin, What Angela Merkel’s New Refugee Policy Misses, FORTUNE (Dec. 20, 2015, 
10:00 AM), https://fortune.com/2015/12/20/angela-merkel-migrants-syria/. 
 10. See, e.g., Anemona Hartocollis, How the Migrants’ March Toward Germany Began, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 6, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/reporters-notebook/migrants/march-
budapest-hungary [https://perma.cc/LA5B-WD2N]; Alan Taylor, Thousands of Migrants Are Crossing 
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Moreover, most other European countries resisted Merkel’s initiative, 
and many actively blockaded the refugees. Viktor Orban, the 
authoritarian prime minister of Hungary, strung razor wire along his 
country’s border.11 And—of great significance to the argument for 
why taming is necessary—Orban has relentlessly used the issue of 
uncontrolled migration to expand his party’s voting strength and 
weaken Hungary’s checks and balances. He does so in order to create 
what he has proudly labelled “illiberal democracy.”12 Keep this in 
mind. Orban’s skillful playing of immigration backlash has proved a 
model for other would-be autocrats.13 
The backlash also mushroomed in Germany. Six months after 
Merkel’s policy announcement, adverse outcomes in local elections, 
combined with criticism from EU members, convinced the Chancellor 
that the policy could not be sustained.14 The EU negotiated a new 
agreement with Turkey in March 2016. It provided essentially for 
Turkish efforts to stop the outbound boat flow, assurances of safe 
conditions for Syrians in Turkish refugee camps, and EU aid and other 
concessions to Turkey.15 But even after the flow was contained, 
Merkel lost political ground. Far-right parties won a place in the 
                                                                                                             
the Balkans on Foot, ATLANTIC (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2015/10/thousands-
of-migrants-are-crossing-the-balkans-on-foot/412453/ [https://perma.cc/JW7G-GP3A]. 
 11. Helene Bienvenu & Rick Lyman, Hungary Blocks Migrants in Border Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/16/world/europe/hungary-detains-migrants-in-
border-crackdown.html [https://perma.cc/GPD4-XS37]. 
 12. Steven Erlanger, What Should Europe Do About Viktor Orban and ‘Illiberal Democracy’?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/23/world/europe/tusk-orban-migration-
eu.html [https://perma.cc/H6UU-YMHU]. 
 13. See Robert Kagan, The Strongmen Strike Back, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2019/03/14/feature/the-strongmen-strike-back/ 
[https://perma.cc/RGU2-XSG5]; see also Simon Shuster, European Politics Are Swinging to the Right, 
TIME (Sept. 22, 2016), https://time.com/4504010/europe-politics-swing-right/ [https://perma.cc/444H-
CLCP]. 
 14. Madeline Chambers & Tina Bellon, German Voters Batter Merkel Over Migrant Policy, REUTERS 
(Mar. 12, 2016, 6:15 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-election/german-voters-batter-
merkel-over-migrant-policy-idUSKCN0WE0ZQ [https://perma.cc/E7CA-4E7B]. 
 15. Press Release, European Council, EU–Turkey Statement (Mar. 18, 2016); Anthony Faiola & Griff 
Witte, E.U. Strikes Deal to Return New Migrants to Turkey, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/europe-offers-deal-to-turkey-to-take-back-
migrants/2016/03/18/809d80ba-ebab-11e5-bc08-3e03a5b41910_story.html [https://perma.cc/8JEC-
FT6C]. 
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Bundestag for the first time in modern Germany.16 Poland, Italy, and 
Austria also brought anti-immigrant parties to power.17 
II.   What Is at Stake 
These are the stakes—now as never before. We used to worry that 
polarization and backlash against untamed migration would lead to bad 
immigration policy. But today, ineffectiveness in immigration policy 
threatens much wider consequences. Extremist parties regularly find 
in immigration-control failures their richest opportunities to sow 
division, win power, and infuse a wide range of authoritarian features 
into what were once stalwart democracies.18 
Regrettably—remarkably—the United States is also vulnerable. Our 
democracy is more fragile than most would have thought.19 
To preserve the political space for reasonably open immigration 
policy, and more broadly to contain and reverse a global wave of 
authoritarianism, we do not need deep cuts in legal migration or harsh 
treatment of migrants. But we do need restoration of the rule of 
law—in reality and in shared public perception. We need a 
revitalization of regular migration following proper screening. We 
need resolute but proportional enforcement. We need taming, not 
hobbling—reassurance, not overreaction. 
Sometimes it looks as though we are divided between those on the 
right who chant “build the wall,” “send them back,” or “no amnesty” 
and factions on the left who want to decriminalize clandestine entry or 
abolish ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the agency with 
primary responsibility for interior enforcement and detention). 
                                                                                                             
 16. Jabeen Bhatti, Germany’s Far-Right AfD Party Gains Seats in National Parliament in Major 
Cultural Shift, USA TODAY (Sept. 24, 2017, 5:50 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/09/24/germany-afd-gains-seats-national-
parliament/698039001/ [https://perma.cc/7XMZ-VV5D]. 
 17. Krisztina Than, Hungary Seeks Broader Anti-Migrant Alliance After Austria, Italy Elections, 
REUTERS (Mar. 12, 2018, 12:05 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-hungary-
minister/hungary-seeks-broader-anti-migrant-alliance-after-austria-italy-elections-idUSKCN1GO21D 
[https://perma.cc/MF83-LSLL]. 
 18. Europe and Right-Wing Nationalism: A Country-by-Country Guide, BBC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006 [https://perma.cc/EJZ5-RY45]. 
 19. See generally STEVEN LEBITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018); TIMOTHY 
D. SNYDER, ON TYRANNY: TWENTY LESSONS FROM THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2017). 
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Political bargaining can barely get off the ground because on both sides 
the loudest voices are from self-appointed purity police, who pounce 
on the slightest indications of compromise.20 Purists from both sides 
torpedoed promising deals in 2017 that could have legislated a full 
legal status for Dreamers in return for modest new enforcement 
measures.21 
III.   Paths Toward Solutions 
A.  The Groundwork 
We need to find ways to sideline or ignore the purity police. This 
won’t be easy, but there is definitely ground to build on. Let me paint 
a more nuanced picture of the current attitudinal landscape. That 
panorama can help us design reforms that might someday succeed. 
In my judgment, the vast majority of Americans are in neither of 
those polarized camps. They pay attention to immigration issues 
episodically, and how they react at any given time depends on the 
                                                                                                             
 20. See Jason Willick, The DACA Fight and the End of Politics, AM. INT. (Sept. 5, 2017), 
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/09/05/daca-fight-end-politics/ [https://perma.cc/224T-
L2QP] (“Instead of a set of public-spirited representatives bargaining for partial victories, we are now 
watching maximalist factional leaders performing ideological purity rituals to increase their status within 
their tribes.”).  
 21. On the efforts of conservatives to derail a deal and avoid an “amnesty” precedent, see DAVIS & 
SHEAR, supra note 3, at 156–86. On the Democrats’ difficulties in agreeing to any enforcement measures, 
see Obed Manuel, DACA, Immigration Advocates Say They Won’t Support Trump’s Wall but Are Open 
to Some Compromise, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Dec. 18, 2018, 6:45 AM), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/immigration/2018/12/18/daca-immigration-advocates-say-they-
wont-support-trump-s-wall-but-are-open-to-some-compromise/ [https://perma.cc/V3MR-RQXS].   
“Dreamers” refers generally to persons who came to the United States as children and have lived in 
the United States for at least five years. A Brief History of Civil Rights in the United States, GEO. L. LIBR. 
(last updated Feb. 7, 2020, 3:35 PM), https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=592919&p=4170929 
[https://perma.cc/R79C-PZGY]. The term derives from the DREAM Act (Development, Relief, and 
Education for Alien Minors Act), first introduced by Senators Richard Durbin (D-IL) and Orrin Hatch 
(R-UT), in 2001 as S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2001), and regularly reintroduced, with variations, through 
2019. Id. Each bill would have provided for a path to lawful permanent residence for persons who came 
to the United States as children, had resided for a stated period, and met certain other requirements. Id. 
Despite majority support at various times in the two chambers of Congress, no version has been enacted. 
Id. Under President Obama, the Department of Homeland Security provided a form of interim relief, 
including work authorization, for persons who met DREAM-Act-type requirements; the relief became 
known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, 
Dep’t Homeland Sec., on Deferred Action Process for Young People Who Are Low Enforcement 
Priorities (June 15, 2012); A Brief History of Civil Rights in the United States, supra. 
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incident that happens to spark the latest headlines. Most 
Americans—though not all—share genuine pride in our heritage as a 
nation of immigrants and want to see that continue. But this welcoming 
impulse coexists, for most of us, with a concern about control, a worry 
that immigration could get out of hand, either through high numbers 
who enter or stay illegally or through lax screening in an era of 
significant threats—from terrorism, for example, or contagious 
disease. To be clear, this impulse to control does not demand zero 
immigration or even sharp cuts. It can coexist with relatively high 
levels of immigration, as long as the flow is seen as subject to 
deliberate decisions by the polity.22 
Here’s the main takeaway: Building a sustainable, workable 
immigration management system has to win the support of most of this 
large and somewhat conflicted constituency in the middle. To do so, 
we have to serve both the impulse to welcome and the impulse to 
control—that is, to honor our identity as a nation of immigrants while 
also defending our proud commitment to the rule of law. 
My many decades of work in this field lead me to this conclusion: 
The most effective way to preserve that balance is not to cut overall 
numbers of lawful admissions, but to get a solid handle on reducing 
unauthorized migration.23 There are both good ways and bad ways to 
get there. 
B.   Background Conditions: A Look at the Migration Data 
If we take a step away from the slogans and purity rituals, the 
objective conditions today, in late 2019, for achieving reform are 
actually pretty favorable. The overall flow of unlawful migration to the 
United States has been greatly reduced as compared to a decade ago, 
and the number of unauthorized residents has declined steadily from 
                                                                                                             
 22. An extensive and well-designed multi-factor polling project carried out in disparate European 
countries strongly supports the idea that most publics support immigration, but also highly value 
governmental control. Anne-Marie Jeannet et al., What asylum and refugee policies do Europeans want? 
Evidence from a cross-national conjoint experiment 9 (European Univ. Inst., Working Paper No. RSCAS 
2019/73). 
 23. For an expanded treatment of this claim, see David A. Martin, Resolute Enforcement Is Not Just 
for Restrictionists: Building a Stable and Efficient Immigration Enforcement System, 30 J. L. & POL. 411, 
412 (2015). 
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2008 through the last authoritative estimate in 2017. As one can see in 
Figure 1, based on estimates by the respected Pew Research Center, 
the unauthorized population topped out at 12.2 million in 2008, then 
declined slowly but steadily for several years.24 The final entry on the 
graph is 10.5 million. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now focus on the left side of the graph, especially 1995–2008, with 
its steeper upward slope. During that period, net growth of the 
unauthorized resident population was 500,000 to 800,000 each year. A 
high percentage were settling in new destinations—states and 
municipalities that had previously seen few immigrants. Those speedy 
and visible local changes stressed social interactions and increased 
demands on local government resources. We tend to forget this 
then-dominant mood today, a dozen years later, but these community 
                                                                                                             
 24. See Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Mexicans Decline to Less Than Half the U.S. Unauthorized 
Immigrant Population for the First Time, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/12/us-unauthorized-immigrant-population-2017/ 
[https://perma.cc/7T9K-6QQD]. 
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stresses in turn produced widespread local demands for more federal 
enforcement,25 as well as enactment of restrictionist state and local 
laws.26 
I need to add an important asterisk to this account. We don’t yet 
have comparable estimates of the overall unauthorized population for 
2019, and as I’m sure you know, we had a major upsurge in migration 
that year—primarily Central Americans coming to the southwest 
border and claiming asylum. The next graph depicts that surge (Figure 
2). It shows Border Patrol statistics on border apprehensions for the 
last thirty years—a primary, though imperfect, indicator of the 
magnitude of unauthorized migration. The highest year was 2000, 
when apprehensions reached nearly 1.7 million.  But the picture turned 
sharply for 2009 through 2018, when apprehensions frequently fell in 
the 300–400,000 range, down by 75% from the flow in 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 25. See Martin, supra note 23, at 443. 
 26. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA, MARYELLEN 
FULLERTON & JULIET P. STUMPF, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 1204–06, 
1227–51 (8th ed. 2016). 
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Fiscal year 2019 shows a big jump from 400,000 to 860,000 
apprehensions. If that trend had continued, the background conditions 
for the reform I advocate would be far less favorable than I am 
generally portraying. But the monthly apprehensions showed a 
significant decline late in the 2019 fiscal year, owing to several 
enforcement initiatives fully implemented beginning in mid-summer. 
Whatever one thinks of the specific initiatives, the changes are 
probably going to be in effect for a lengthy period. The first months of 
fiscal year 2020 show a continuing decline: January’s enforcement 
total fell below 37,000, and it is likely that the full year’s count will 
remain below 500,000.27 The surge asterisk will probably apply only 
to 2019. We’ll see. But with that caveat in mind, I return to the broader 
population trends. 
Because the graph in Figure 1 shows that the unauthorized 
population curve began to turn downward in 2008, many casual 
commentators assume that this was just the product of the Great 
Recession. But the decline continued through 2018—even with a 
roaring economy. More effective border enforcement, based on 
thousands of new Border Patrol agents hired since the 1990s, plays an 
important role.28 Even more important are durable economic and 
demographic changes in Mexico, historically the source of the 
overwhelming majority of unauthorized migrants. Mexico’s birth rate 
has declined significantly. It is now 2.2, not much higher than the U.S. 
rate—down from 3.5 in 1990 and nearly 7 births per woman in 1970.29 
Social science experts state that the era of large-scale migration from 
                                                                                                             
 27. Southwest Border Migration FY 2020, DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY (Mar. 12, 2020), 
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration [https://perma.cc/Q34F-QJYR]. The cited 
source shows border statistics from FY 2015 through the present. Id. This series, updated monthly by the 
Border Patrol, is based on both southwest border apprehensions and persons found inadmissible based on 
processing at southwest ports of entry. Id. Figure 2, in contrast, is based solely on Border Patrol 
apprehensions and does not include persons deemed inadmissible upon inspection at a port of entry. 
Nonetheless, the broad picture of migration trends is the same using either measure.  
 28. See Marc C. Rosenblum, New Era in Immigration Enforcement at the U.S. Southwest Border, 
MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/new-era-
immigration-enforcement-us-southwest-border [https://perma.cc/6RWR-LUAK]. 
 29. Richard Miles, A Smaller, Wealthier Mexico Is on the Horizon, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L 
STUD. (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.csis.org/analysis/smaller-wealthier-mexico-horizon 
[https://perma.cc/UY6H-LJMA]. 
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Mexico is over.30 The graph in Figure 3, showing that Mexicans now 
constitute a minority of unauthorized migrants, highlights this 
evolution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C.   Taking a Cue from Local Law Enforcement 
With that groundwork, we can find important guideposts toward 
workable and sustainable reforms by paying close attention to how 
localities have responded to the reduced flow of unlawful migration 
since 2008. 
Over the last dozen years, though the picture is by no means 
uniform, we have seen a significant pendulum swing at the local level, 
away from demands by local police for greater federal immigration 
enforcement against newcomers arrested for a local crime. When I was 
                                                                                                             
 30. See Kevin Sieff, Why Is Mexican Migration Slowing While Guatemalan and Honduran Migration 
Is Surging?, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2019, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/why-is-mexican-migration-slowing-while-
guatemalan-and-honduran-migration-is-surging/2019/04/28/fad52432-6493-11e9-a698-
2a8f808c9cfb_story.html [https://perma.cc/S2RN-9QHE]. 
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General Counsel to the Immigration and Naturalization Service in 
1995 to 1998, such calls were common and insistent—though, as 
noted, that attitude is largely forgotten today. Today’s trend is instead 
toward local resistance to immigration enforcement. More and more 
jurisdictions are restricting their cooperation with federal immigration 
authorities. Restrictions take many different forms but are often 
grouped together under the misleading label “sanctuary cities.”31 
Many jurisdictions decline to honor ICE detainers, which are requests 
to hold persons identified as immigration violators who have been 
arrested on a state or local criminal charge, so that ICE can pick them 
up when the criminal justice process concludes. Some decline even to 
notify ICE of the time when release is going to occur. Others are more 
selective; they will notify about persons charged with, or perhaps only 
those convicted of, serious offenses, but not for persons with lesser 
crimes.32 
So how did we get here, to that kind of resistance by law 
enforcement organizations?  And how did it happen in an arena where 
before about 2010 there had generally been cooperative relations, and 
the federal government was seen as rightfully taking the lead—on both 
priorities and enforcement strategies?33 Have these law enforcement 
organizations been converted to the doctrine that there should be no 
immigration control? Have they become believers in open borders? 
From my research and from conversations with sheriffs and police 
chiefs, the evidence is to the contrary. That fact provides an 
unappreciated but essential foothold for finding a way out of our 
lengthy stalemate over immigration reform. These sanctuary policies 
                                                                                                             
 31. See Tal Kopan, What Are Sanctuary Cities, and Can They Be Defunded?, CNN (Mar. 26, 2018, 
3:40 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politics/sanctuary-cities-explained/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/49QM-EV5L]. 
 32. See Martin, supra note 23, at 450. 
 33. In Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 393–94, 416 (2012), the U.S. government challenged 
the constitutionality of a highly restrictive immigration enforcement law enacted by the state legislature. 
Several prominent immigrant advocacy organizations (including those now supporting sanctuary cities) 
filed amicus briefs strongly favoring the U.S. position and the primacy of the federal government in 
making immigration enforcement decisions. Id. The Court struck down most of the challenged Arizona 
provisions, relying significantly on this argument for federal primacy. See, e.g., id. at 394–95, 407–10. 
The amicus briefs are available through SCOTUSblog. Arizona v. United States, SCOTUSBLOG, 
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/arizona-v-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/9LJX-ZSYQ] 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2020). 
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have taken hold precisely because the last ten years have seen such a 
decline in illicit border crossing. The unauthorized population is stable 
in most locations. Unlike the high-growth era of the 2000s, such 
people, after years of living here, have been woven into the economic 
and social fabric of the local community.34 The police chiefs and 
mayors staking out a sanctuary stance are not calling for withdrawing 
the Border Patrol from the border or abandoning immigration controls. 
Indeed, they implicitly depend on effective border control to make 
sanctuary feasible. What has sparked their resistance to cooperation is 
the perception that, in the current climate, cooperation with ICE will 
ensnare mostly long-standing residents of the community, persons 
with deep ties to local employers, churches, PTAs, soccer 
leagues—the list goes on.35 
Moreover, in the early days of the federal program called Secure 
Communities, which automated the sharing with ICE of fingerprints 
taken upon local arrest and booking, a great many of the affected 
people were put into removal proceedings based not on major criminal 
charges but on low-level offenses and arrests—notably driving without 
a license.  But most such people could not obtain a driver’s license 
because of ill-advised state law restrictions enacted in a stampede in 
2007–2008.36 Look carefully at Figure 4, depicting 
duration-of-residence data for the unauthorized population. Because 
almost 70% have been here for more than ten years, the risk of finding 
long-stayers in any local jail arrest line is quite high. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 34. See Martin, supra note 23, at 417–20; Damien Cave, Living with Immigration, N.Y. Times (June 
21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/us/the-way-north.html#p/; Damien Cave, On 
Immigration, the Hard Lines Start to Blur, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/21/us/on-immigration-the-hard-lines-start-to-blur.html?_r=1 
[https://perma.cc/9YAG-KYTA]. 
 35. Martin, supra note 23, at 444–45. 
 36. Id. at 446. 
13
Martin: Taming Immigration
Published by Reading Room,
984 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I doubt we would have seen the same growing backlash against 
cooperation with ICE if federal officers—from the beginning—had 
exercised discretion to issue detainers only against recent violators or 
persons with serious criminal charges. This is highly important. 
Sheriffs mostly would not object to action against someone who 
entered without inspection three months ago or a tourist who 
overstayed his brief admission period by seven months and then got 
arrested in a bar fight. 
Most such local officials are not opposed to all immigration control 
but instead are rebelling against what they see as a disproportionate 
sanction—deportation—being imposed on longstanding and 
well-integrated residents. If that is correct, then we could deploy a 
sharply different method to start winning back their cooperation.  It 
marks out a strategy that should also gain support for resolute 
enforcement from a far wider segment of the public—from left and 
right. 
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D.   The Central Importance of a Well-Designed Legalization 
Program 
Legalization of long-staying unauthorized residents—in a phased 
process that could include modest penalty fees and other 
requirements—would provide the clearest possible assurance that 
future immigration enforcement is going to focus on new and recent 
violators. Most advocacy for an expansive legalization program, of the 
kind that actually passed the Senate in 2013 by a huge bipartisan 
majority of 68–32,37 focuses on humanitarian reasons to recognize the 
contributions of those who have lived and worked in our communities. 
That is a solid and worthy foundation.  But those who desire a healthy 
and vigorous enforcement system—stable and sustainable over the 
years—should support legalization as well. It is indispensable in order 
to free up enforcement resources and immigration court capacity to 
deal with new and recent violators. Legalization, done right, empowers 
resolute enforcement against the remaining pool of recent violators. As 
to them, a much greater consensus exists about the justice of 
enforcement. Furthermore, a swift return of recent violators to the 
country of origin sends a far more effective deterrent message than the 
deportation of people who had lost touch after a decade or more in the 
United States. 
Only by patiently widening the circle of support for measured and 
balanced enforcement can we find our way to a sustainable 
equilibrium, an equilibrium that also—and significantly—preserves 
public support for our traditional levels of legal permanent 
immigration. 
E.   The Key Elements of Reform 
What to do? As a matter of policy science (rather than immediately 
actionable political will), there has been surprising consensus for at 
least fifteen years on the basic elements of a solution. It includes three 
                                                                                                             
 37. Ed O’Keefe, Senate Approves Comprehensive Immigration Bill, WASH. POST (June 27, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised-to-approve-massive-immigration-
bill/2013/06/27/87168096-df32-11e2-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_story.html [https://perma.cc/C73J-DTFB]. 
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main parts, summarized in the first three headings on Table 1.38 And 
after the painful experiences of this past year—the large-scale arrival 
of asylum seekers and a blizzard of poorly managed, gratuitously 
harsh, or ill-considered policies in response—we need to add a fourth 
heading: asylum reform. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first element, as I mentioned, would be a generous legalization 
or amnesty program, with conditions, for most of the 10 million in the 
current unauthorized population. There would be a cutoff date; 
applicants would have to show they began residing here at some point 
two or three years in the past, for example, and they would probably 
                                                                                                             
 38. I have provided more details on this sort of proposal in Martin, supra note 23, at 426–64 and David 
A. Martin, Go Comprehensive, Go Bold, MILLER CTR. (May 25, 2016), https://millercenter.org/issues-
policy/us-domestic-policy/go-comprehensive-go-bold [https://perma.cc/5H9U-FY6D]. 
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have to pay various fines and fees. Persons with a significant criminal 
record would not qualify. 
The remaining elements amount to steps to minimize and deter 
future illegal migration so that we don’t get ourselves into the same 
soup again a decade or so down the road, with a newly arrived 
population of millions of unauthorized residents. 
Element two would be revisions to our legal migration 
provisions—both permanent and temporary—so that they would better 
match up with migration pressures and desires. This reform is 
important, but it calls for a big caveat. Some commentators suggest 
that we can provide legal channels wide enough to capture or satisfy 
nearly all migration pressures.39 This is simply wrong. Migration 
desires are not static. An expansive guest worker program, for 
example, will generate rising pressure for more such migration on the 
part of foreign workers and especially of U.S. employers.40 That reality 
has to be addressed through proper program design that helps make 
sure temporary migration remains temporary. And more broadly, in a 
world of 7.7 billion people, we cannot conceivably hold forth an 
opportunity for all who would like to come to the United States. We 
will still need to choose, and we will still need to say a firm “No” to a 
lot of admirable, productive, hard-working people who would like to 
migrate. 
Nonetheless, better tailoring of our legal migration categories is 
worthwhile. We can improve our provisions for employment-based 
migration and also phase out some family categories that now face 
enormous backlogs—particularly the category for siblings of U.S. 
citizens, for whom visas are now being issued only to people who 
applied over thirteen years ago.41 That would enable quicker 
unification of the remaining family categories. I would argue, 
however, against significant cutbacks in the overall family admissions 
                                                                                                             
 39. See for example, Daniel T. Griswold, Willing Workers: Fixing the Problem of Illegal Mexican 
Migration to the United States, CATO INSTITUTE’S CTR. FOR TRADE & POL’Y STUD., Oct. 15, 2002, at 1, 
11, critiqued in David A. Martin, Eight Myths About Immigration Enforcement, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 525, 533 (2007). 
 40. Philip L. Martin & Michael S. Teitelbaum, The Mirage of Mexican Guest Workers, 80 FOREIGN 
AFF. 117, 119–21 (2001). 
 41. See BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, VISA BULLETIN 2 (Mar. 2020). 
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ceiling, as some urge in order to free up more spaces for 
employment-based immigrants. Recent scholarship suggests that 
family-based immigrants make vital and underappreciated 
contributions to the health of our economy, not significantly different 
from the measurable economic benefit derived from immigrants 
explicitly selected based on skills.42 And pre-existing family networks 
speed the transition of the new arrivals, foster early integration, and 
improve resilience as an immigrant changes jobs or encounters 
setbacks.   
Element number three of my reform agenda is resolute enforcement 
focused on recent and new violators—that is, against a reconceived 
target landscape. This element has many components. It begins with 
continued border deployment. The Border Patrol is now five times 
larger than when I was first in government, in 197843—with a notable 
effect on border crossings, as the border apprehensions graph in Figure 
2 depicts. 
In part it is also a matter of fully funding immigration courts, which 
now have record-level backlogs—nearly a million as of 2019, as 
shown in Figure 5.44 The resulting multi-year delays undercut and 
demoralize almost all other parts of the enforcement agenda. 
Mastering this situation is not just a matter of hiring more judges. A 
broad legalization would be the most effective single stroke to make 
the immigration court system healthy again. Hundreds of thousands in 
those backlog bars would be diverted to a speedier administrative 
process that would assess their eligibility for legalization and, if they 
qualify, produce the dismissal of their deportation charges. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 42. See e.g., Alan Hyde, The Law and Economics of Family Unification, 28 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 355, 
355 (2014); David Brancaccio, How Family-Based Immigration Can Boost the Economy, MARKETPLACE 
(Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.marketplace.org/2018/02/27/immigration-data/ [https://perma.cc/4H4G-
2JQJ]. 
 43. See UNITED STATES BORDER PATROL, BORDER PATROL AGENT NATIONWIDE STAFFING BY 
FISCAL YEAR 1 (2019). 
 44. See Marissa Esthimer, Crisis in the Courts: Is the Backlogged U.S. Immigration Court System at 
Its Breaking Point?, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Oct. 3, 2019), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/backlogged-us-immigration-courts-breaking-point 
[https://perma.cc/7Q6N-NRLZ]. 
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Further, resolute enforcement involves pursuing serious, fair 
interior enforcement—the domain of ICE. We need gradual restoration 
of carefully designed cooperation programs with state and local law 
enforcement. This will probably have to wait until we are several 
months into the granting of legalization to substantial numbers of 
applicants—the most reliable guarantee that a jurisdiction’s 
cooperation on enforcement will spare the long-time unauthorized 
resident. Cooperation should not mean that local law enforcement 
officers become immigration agents. They should instead concentrate 
on doing their own jobs, enforcing the criminal law in the context of 
their own communities.45 But after long-stayers are legalized, local law 
enforcement should cooperate with requests for information and 
handovers to ICE in response to detainers. 
Another crucial change is to supplement direct government 
enforcement with measures that will discourage migration by drying 
up job opportunities for the unauthorized. Current employer screening 
                                                                                                             
 45. Martin, supra note 23, at 438–58. 
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of new hires is often easily defeated by false documents. But we have 
an existing and well-tried system, called E-Verify, that allows 
employers to do a simple computer check of the work authorization of 
their new hires.46 Right now, participation in E-Verify is largely 
voluntary with employers, but even so, over 50% of U.S. hires go 
through this system.47 Reform legislation would phase in mandatory 
participation for virtually all jobs; it also needs resolute measures to 
strengthen the system’s capacity to defeat identity fraud.48 
Finally, we should undertake a new and systematic campaign to 
enforce the law against visa overstayers—people who enter legally on 
a temporary visa, but then don’t leave when they should. Contrary to 
the popular image of undocumented workers, most new immigration 
violators today are overstayers rather than people who sneak across the 
border. The best estimates say that that has been the case for the past 
seven years or more.49 
For decades, overstay enforcement has been a low priority for the 
enforcement agencies. That has not changed much, even with new 
Homeland Security data systems that can now provide, each day, a 
reliable list identifying those whose stay expired but for whom there is 
no evidence that they departed. We need to assign a large cohort of 
ICE officers to take the list, locate these recent violators promptly, and 
put them systematically into removal proceedings. We do not have to 
guarantee finding every overstayer for this change to be effective. The 
visible prospect of swift consequences for new violators will teach all 
persons here in temporary status that they must take seriously the end 
date printed on their admission card. Spontaneous compliance should 
quickly improve.50 
                                                                                                             
 46. Id. at 427–32. 
 47. See id. at 428 & n.66 (estimating coverage of 40% of hires in 2015, when 500,000 employers were 
using the E-Verify system; today 870,000 employers participate); What Is E-Verify, DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY, https://www.e-verify.gov/about-e-verify/what-is-e-verify [https://perma.cc/6L4J-A6AY] (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2020). 
 48. See Martin, supra note 23, at 429–30. 
 49. See Robert Warren, U.S. Undocumented Population Continued to Fall from 2016 to 2017 and Visa 
Overstays Significantly Exceeded Illegal Crossings for the Seventh Consecutive Year, 7 J. MIGRATION & 
HUM. SECURITY 19, 20 (2019). 
 50. Martin, supra note 23, at 432–37. 
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Applying serious resources to these diverse efforts would provide a 
powerful and early indicator of commitment to resolute enforcement, 
enforcement tempered by a rigorous focus on recent violators. 
IV.   The Asylum Dilemma 
The reforms just sketched would address the primary immigration 
problems that have preoccupied our country for two decades. They 
would lay the foundation for one day achieving a stable and sustainable 
U.S. immigration system—a system affording reasonable assurance 
that ordinary unauthorized migration is under control, while 
preserving the political space for generous legal immigration. 
But there is one final arena that cries out to be addressed—a form 
of migration that cannot really be described as ordinary. I am speaking 
of political asylum. Asylum is rich with the impulse to welcome, 
especially when one focuses on individual claimants. But asylum sows 
deep worry, especially in times of high flow, for the impulse to control. 
Why? Under treaties drafted in the 1950s and 1960s, accepted by most 
nations around the world, asylum and related protections are available 
to people who flee their home countries and prove that they fear return 
because of a “well-founded fear of being persecuted.”51 That elusively 
worded standard is often exceptionally difficult to apply. And 
crucially, the laws and treaties don’t say that such protections are 
available only to the first 1,000 or 10,000 or 500,000 who meet the 
standard each year.52 
                                                                                                             
 51. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. 
 52. An ambitious empirical study involving 12,000 respondents from eight European countries found 
strong public desire for such features, even though they may be inconsistent with treaty provisions: 
[European publics are] generally committed to policies that provide protection to 
asylum-seekers and refugees but this commitment tends to be contingent upon policy 
features which allow for a means of control . . . . 
. . . . 
[P]olicies which place annual limits on the number of asylum applications are 
significantly more supported than those that do not apply limits []. . . . 
. . . . 
It seems that some aspects of the current model of the international refugee system are 
misaligned with the more control-based model that Europeans would prefer. For 
example, an annual limit on the number of asylum seekers would be incompatible with 
the 1951 Geneva Convention . . . . [O]ur results raise questions about the political 
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The United States, like other wealthy countries, has primarily 
implemented these legal protections through detailed individual 
adjudications. In the early 1990s, the system was overwhelmed with 
applications (over 150,000 annually), partly because mere application 
routinely led, at that time, to prompt work authorization that continued 
throughout the process. Therefore, even marginal or bogus claims 
quickly produced a secure status likely to last for years.53 
Reforms that began in 1995 restored sound functioning and 
produced firm decisions within six months in nearly all cases. This was 
a major achievement, based on sound design and on the virtual 
doubling of the asylum officer corps and of the ranks of immigration 
judges. Merely filing an asylum application no longer resulted in work 
authorization. That had to await an actual grant of asylum. In a solid 
case, a grant from an asylum officer could happen within six weeks. 
Unsuccessful applicants, on the other hand, were routinely placed in 
deportation proceedings. This gave them a further opportunity to 
present evidence supporting their claim. But if the immigration judge 
then found against them, they would typically receive a removal order 
within six months of initial filing.54 Once that process became 
established—it took a couple of years—applications dropped 
considerably. Weak or false claims were deterred. Asylum faded from 
the headlines.55 
How did that seemingly stable solution come unraveled? Part of the 
answer is this: short-sighted federal budgeting in the lean years 
brought on by the recession, beginning about 2011. The Department 
of Justice (DOJ) suspended replacement hiring of immigration judges. 
Look back at Figure 5, where the vertical bars show the case backlog 
by year and the more horizontal line represents the rise and fall in the 
                                                                                                             
sustainability of some aspects of the status quo of international asylum and refugee 
policies. 
Jeannet et al., supra note 22, at 2, 9, 12–13. 
 53. See David A. Martin, Making Asylum Policy: The 1994 Reforms, 70 WASH. L. REV. 725, 733–37 
(1995) [hereinafter Making Asylum Policy]. 
 54. See id. at 745–54. 
 55. Noah Lanard, The Clinton Administration Solved Its Own Asylum Crisis: Here’s What Trump Can 
Learn, MOTHERJONES, (Jan. 25, 2019) https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/01/the-clinton-
administration-solved-its-own-asylum-crisis-heres-what-trump-can-learn/ [https://perma.cc/NAA3-
KMQ2]. 
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total number of judges. The line dropped steadily from 2011 to 2014. 
Dockets backed up. This produced more than just longer waiting times 
for decisions. DOJ budget planners unforgivably overlooked a key part 
of the 1995 reforms: if asylum processing did not result in a decision 
by an immigration judge within six months, the regulations required 
issuance of work authorization.56 Once delays became commonplace 
in about 2013, new applicants could feel assured that mere filing would 
result in work authorization after six months. That reality—plus the 
diminished prospect of a deportation order anywhere on the 
horizon—attracted more and more asylum claims, many of them 
marginal. Claims from foreigners already in the country, from a wide 
range of nationalities, escalated. The word also reached Central 
America, contributing to striking surges in undocumented arrivals 
from Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.57 I want to emphasize 
that there is real violence and persecution occurring in those source 
countries. We need to avoid overgeneralizing about weak claims. But 
not everyone is equally threatened. Not everyone’s case meets the legal 
standard for asylum. The overloaded system lost the capacity to make 
those legal distinctions within a timeframe that was operationally 
necessary. 
The problem hit home for the Obama Administration in 2014 
through 2016. The arrival of asylum seekers from El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras surged during this period, including tens of 
thousands of unaccompanied children. They were not evading U.S. 
authorities; they would typically cross the border and immediately 
seek out the Border Patrol so they could initiate an asylum claim.58 
President Obama’s measures in response had some initial effect in 
                                                                                                             
 56. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a) (2011) (implementing Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(d)(2), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(d)(2)).  
 57. David M. Davies, Documentary Report: The Surge in Immigration from Central America, TEX. 
PUB. RADIO (July 7, 2014), https://www.tpr.org/post/documentary-report-surge-immigration-central-
america, [https://perma.cc/RZS5-M7FV]; David A. Martin, How to Fix the Crisis Caused by Central 
American Asylum Seekers — Humanely, VOX (July 4, 2018, 10:44 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-
idea/2018/7/2/17524908/asylum-family-central-america-border-crisis-trump-family-detention-humane-
reform [https://perma.cc/XZH9-KEQH]. 
 58. See Gustavo Valdes et al., Obama Vows Urgent Action as Children Make Perilous Illegal Journey 
into U.S., CNN (June 10, 2014, 10:13 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2014/06/09/us/undocumented-
children-immigrants/index.html [https://perma.cc/74GS-72X5]. 
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reducing the numbers through 2015, but court rulings eventually 
limited his options.59 In May 2016, we were back to receiving 
approximately 50,000 asylum seekers monthly at the southwest 
border. Then-candidate Trump highlighted this ineffectiveness as part 
of his strong anti-immigrant and anti-refugee message—a centerpiece 
of his campaign. 
Trump then won the election, and the arrival numbers showed an 
immediate drop, quite visible in Figure 6, which graphs the benchmark 
numbers for fiscal years 2016 and 2017. In March, apprehensions were 
down by almost 70% over the same period a year earlier. Donald 
Trump may have flattered himself into thinking that his tough rhetoric 
and his mere presence for two months in the Oval Office had solved 
the problem. But any such deterrent effect predictably wore off, and 
the monthly intake for fiscal year 2018 mirrored Obama’s 2016 
experience with remarkable fidelity. Check out Figure 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 59. See Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2016), aff’g in relevant part Flores v. Lynch, 212 
F. Supp. 3d 907 (C.D. Cal. 2015). This litigation produced a ruling that a 1997 settlement of long-running 
litigation over the treatment of minors in immigration custody applied not solely to unaccompanied minors 
but also to those accompanied by family members. See Peter Margulies, What Ending the Flores 
Agreement on Detention of Immigrant Children Really Means, LAWFARE (Aug. 29, 2019, 5:39 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-ending-flores-agreement-detention-immigrant-children-really-
means [https://perma.cc/2QAQ-CKU3]. Of particular importance was a provision that limited detention 
to a maximum of twenty days (with limited exceptions). Id. As a result, DHS had to release most persons 
apprehended as family units before the twenty days expired. Id. 
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Figure 7  shows a striking increase in border arrivals for 2019. The 
growth consisted mostly of family units traveling with children—in 
apparent response to court decisions that limited family detention to 
twenty days. That surge overwhelmed DHS resources and facilities.60 
President Trump was reportedly furious. In response, the 
Administration flailed about for a while, testing dramatic new 
deterrents or obstacles—and also regularly throwing high officials out 
the window at DHS (some of them are friends of mine), replacing them 
with a series of acting officers.61 These impulsive control initiatives 
have at times triggered visceral public condemnation—particularly the 
child separation policy—and they certainly fanned the flames of 
judicial skepticism, resulting in numerous preliminary injunctions 
against Trump’s initiatives.62  
The judicial skepticism is deserved because many steps were 
inconsistent with the statute, badly lawyered or administered, or just 
inhumane.63 But a few court injunctions went too far—especially the 
ruling imposing a twenty-day limit on family detention, which was 
based, in my view, on a misreading of the 1997 Flores settlement 
                                                                                                             
 60. The primary decisions are cited in note 59 supra. Further commentary on the role of these court 
decisions can be found in HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, FINAL EMERGENCY INTERIM REPORT: 
CBP FAMILIES AND CHILDREN CARE PANEL 1, 2, 8 (Apr. 16, 2019) [hereinafter HSAC INTERIM REPORT] 
(early 2019 crisis was “further exacerbated” by the Flores ruling); HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, 
CBP FAMILIES AND CHILDREN CARE PANEL FINAL REPORT 1, 5, 14, 15, 23 (Nov. 14, 2019) [hereinafter 
HSAC FINAL REPORT] (the 2019 surge in family unit migration was “extraordinary and unprecedented”; 
“the Flores decision was perhaps the single greatest factor in creating the current crisis”). See generally 
Margulies, supra note 59. 
 61. Davis & Shear,  BORDER WARS, supra note 3, at 378–88 (chapter titled “The Purge”). 
 62. See id. at 253–79, 285, 292–93. 
 63. See, e.g., id. at 70–91. The spate of rulings against President Trump’s January 2017 travel ban 
forced two extensive revisions to the ban order before the Supreme Court upheld the final version in 
Trump v. Hawaii. 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). In East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 
755 (9th Cir. 2018), a motions panel found the plaintiffs likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that 
a presidential proclamation and resulting regulations, which would have prohibited grants of asylum to 
persons entering the United States away from ports of entry, are invalid as inconsistent with the asylum 
statute. Id. The panel therefore denied a stay pending appeal of the district court’s preliminary injunction. 
Id. Judicial rulings also carefully supervised efforts to reunite with their parents thousands of children 
who had been separated under the “zero tolerance” policy of mid-2018. Maria Sacchetti, In Another Blow 
to Trump, Judge Rules in Favor of ACLU in Family Separations Case, WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2019, 10:11 
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration/in-another-blow-to-trump-judge-rules-in-
favor-of-aclu-in-family-separation-case/2019/03/08/9199f0c8-3938-11e9-a06c-
3ec8ed509d15_story.html [https://perma.cc/3J2V-NMTC]. 
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agreement. That ruling  had a major effect on migration patterns from 
2015 onward.64 
What should be done to get the system back to a sustainable 
equilibrium? That is a deeply challenging and complex question. I’ll 
offer here a few brief suggestions, summarized in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First, absolutely central to any long-term answer is getting our 
individual adjudication system healthy again—back to the point where 
it can produce yes-or-no decisions by immigration judges within six 
months. Such decisions constitute the fairest and most reliable 
deterrent: prompt denial of asylum (thereby precluding work 
authorization) to specific people whose claims have been heard and 
judged unqualified—rather than harsh measures visited on all who 
                                                                                                             
 64. See note 59 supra.   
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seek asylum.65 We urgently need to bend downward the curve on these 
immigration court backlog numbers. But that may take many years, 
especially if no legalization program emerges. We need other creative 
steps in the meantime. 
The best ideas I have seen for that interim period came from a 
bipartisan panel of the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC). 
Its initial report in April 2019, when monthly arrivals of asylum 
seekers reached 100,000, recommended legislative and executive 
action to establish three or four regional processing centers along the 
southwest border. The centers, the second component of a 
strengthened system, would centralize and standardize both housing 
and legal decision-making on asylum claims filed in that region. 
Applicants would remain in custody there until either granted asylum 
or ruled deportable, but firm standards would command humane 
conditions in both family and individual detention centers. The report 
soundly called for legislation to override the Flores court’s twenty-day 
limit on family detention, but every effort would be made to expedite 
decisions, by hiring more officers, judges, lawyers, interpreters, and 
other support staff. Denied claimants could be readily located for 
removal because they would be housed at the center.66 
And then the report offered a politically bold surprise: the panel 
urged consideration, primarily for reasons of efficiency, of 
government-funded defense counsel for asylum seekers at the centers, 
modeled on public defender offices in the criminal justice system. That 
should mean no delays awaiting representation from the limited supply 
of pro bono lawyers. Further, with attorneys present from the 
beginning, we could expect greater accuracy and better respect for 
procedural rights, and therefore fewer reversals in federal court.67 
                                                                                                             
 65. See Making Asylum Policy, supra note 53, at 746–50 (discussing the design of 1994 reforms meant 
to serve that end); David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of 
Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1289–94 (1990) (on the importance of developing a deterrent focused 
on unqualified cases). 
 66. HSAC INTERIM REPORT, supra note 60, at 9–12. The HSAC panel’s final report, issued seven 
months later, elaborated on the initial recommendations. HSAC FINAL REPORT, supra note 60, at 7–8, 
14–16, 26–29. 
 67.  HSAC INTERIM REPORT, supra note 60, at 10. 
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Third, whatever we do about border processing centers, we need to 
apply greater resources and creative diplomacy toward eliminating 
root causes, reducing the gang violence and human rights abuses that 
send people in search of international protection. Addressing root 
causes of refugee migration is easy to prescribe and exceptionally hard 
to do effectively. But the track record on addressing source-country 
problems is better than is usually recognized. The Central American 
security initiatives funded by the U.S. government have provided $2.6 
billion to these efforts over the past four years. They have had a 
demonstrable impact in helping to reduce gang violence and murder 
rates.68 
The fourth item on my list is regional cooperation: nearby nations 
share with others the responsibilities involved in this complex business 
of asylum. The potentially shareable tasks, which could be parceled 
out in various patterns among cooperating nations, include shelter or 
housing for asylum seekers, designing and operating adjudication 
procedures, removing unsuccessful claimants, providing durable 
residence for at least some of those who succeed, and of course 
providing funding for the overall enterprise. Burden-sharing has been 
a familiar theme in dealing with refugee issues in the developing 
world, but rare in the wealthier regions where asylum has typically 
been dealt with through individual adjudications. That neglect is 
changing, both because asylum dilemmas are now harder and more 
politically salient and because Mexico, our crucial neighbor, has 
recently shown real willingness for more extensive cooperation. 
Particular versions of cooperation are central in the Trump 
Administration’s actions, but the current mix is deeply deficient. Some 
thinkers who object to Trump’s approach are quietly exploring 
alternative regional models that would advance control but be more 
                                                                                                             
 68. See PETER J. MEYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44812, U.S. STRATEGY FOR ENGAGEMENT IN 
CENTRAL AMERICA: POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 10–14, 18–19 (2019) (describing the regional 
challenges, U.S. programs, and their impact). The HSAC panel’s final report, discussed above, also 
analyzed source country “push factors” in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, offering suggestions 
for international aid and training meant to improve governmental protection in the source countries and 
even to create “shelter in-country where needed.” HSAC FINAL REPORT, supra note 60, at 9–10, 26–29. 
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protective of migrants awaiting a decision, and also provide better 
outcomes for those whose claims are successful.69 
There are three main reasons why regional options are thought 
promising. First, breaking the direct link between a successful asylum 
claim and residence in a wealthy country chosen by the claimant could 
help discourage marginal or abusive claims and help make numbers 
more manageable.70 You might win asylum, but then wind up in San 
Jose, Costa Rica, instead of San Antonio, Texas. Second, the system 
could reach final actionable decisions more quickly, through the 
possibility of less complex hearing and appeal procedures. And third, 
adjudicating closer to the source country makes it easier to repatriate 
those who do not qualify. 
Each of these potential advantages comes with risks. Namely, 
governments may find it easier to take shortcuts—on housing, 
procedures, legal aid. That is a genuine worry. Vigilance against 
backsliding will be required. But the system we now have is filled with 
longcuts, so to speak, which simply aren’t working well; they bog the 
system down and drive the public away from supporting refugees. We 
need balance. 
Possible variations on task sharing are endless, and observers can 
offer only preliminary guesses at this point. But among the more 
promising models are the HSAC advisory panel’s proposal for U.S. 
processing centers just inside our southwest border, discussed before.71 
Other plans, such as one pushed by Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC),72 
call for establishing regional refugee processing facilities in Central 
America or southern Mexico. The United States might fund much of 
                                                                                                             
 69. See David A. Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980: A Forlorn Anniversary, LAWFARE (Mar. 19, 2020, 
2:30 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/refugee-act-1980-forlorn-anniversary [https://perma.cc/L9F8-
ZW55] [hereinafter Forlorn Anniversary]. 
 70.  For early and quite systematic consideration of alternative plans of this sort, see Peter H. Schuck, 
Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 243 (1997); James C. Hathaway & 
R. Alexander Neve, Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and 
Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 115 (1997).   
 71. See sources cited supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 72. Secure and Protect Act of 2019, S. 1494, 116th Cong. (introduced May 16, 2019). The bill was 
marked up and adopted by the Senate Judiciary Committee in August 2019. Tanvi Misra, Senate Panel 
Advances Asylum Bill over Democratic Objections, CQ NEWS (Aug. 1, 2019, 3:46 PM), 
https://www.rollcall.com/2019/08/01/senate-panel-advances-asylum-bill-over-democratic-objections/ 
[https://perma.cc/5SG3-3KN4]. 
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the effort, and it could provide expert asylum officers to interview and 
adjudicate, or to train and supervise other countries’ adjudicators. 
Repatriation duties might fall to the host country. To the greatest extent 
possible, other countries in the hemisphere would join in resettling 
those who meet the protection standards. 
After many unsuccessful trial balloons on asylum restrictions, the 
Trump Administration seems now to be placing its main reliance on 
certain types of regional coordination, primarily the so-called “Remain 
in Mexico” program for Central Americans caught or identified by 
U.S. agents near the U.S. border.73 Serious implementation began in 
early summer 2019. In my view, the sharp drop in border 
apprehensions since May is mainly attributable to this policy. 
Under it, the United States takes on responsibility for asylum 
processing and adjudication. But the applicants wait in Mexico for a 
delayed appointment just to file their application at the port of entry, 
and later for a hearing at the border before a U.S. immigration judge. 
The numbers processed each day are tightly “metered” at each port.74 
A district court enjoined this overall policy, and the court of appeals 
affirmed in February 2020, finding the policy inconsistent with U.S. 
                                                                                                             
 73. See Dara Lind, “Remain in Mexico”: Trump’s Quietly Expanding Crackdown on Asylum Seekers, 
Explained, VOX (Mar. 22, 2019, 2:04 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019/3/5/18244995/migrant-
protection-protocols-border-asylum-trump-mexico [https://perma.cc/3L28-38T5]; The Real Border 
Crisis Is Trump’s Remain in Mexico Policy, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2020, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-real-border-crisis-is-trumps-remain-in-mexico-
policy/2020/03/06/02d6964c-5cd8-11ea-9055-5fa12981bbbf_story.html [https://perma.cc/349Q-GVK7].  
The Trump Administration is also adding “asylum cooperative agreements” with Guatemala, El 
Salvador, and Honduras, negotiated in 2019, as additional means to turn asylum seekers away without 
considering their applications, sending them to have their claims heard in one of those Central American 
nations. Nicole Narea, Trump’s Agreements in Central America Are Dismantling the Asylum System as 
We Know It, VOX (Nov. 20, 2019, 3:08 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019/9/26/20870768/trump-
agreement-honduras-guatemala-el-salvador-explained [https://perma.cc/AD6X-QM99]. The 
implementing regulations appear at 84 Fed. Reg. 63,994 (Nov. 19, 2019). The Administration claims 
authority for these steps in INA § 208(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A) (2018), which permits the 
barring of an asylum application, without consideration of the merits, if the person may be removed to a 
“safe third country” pursuant to an international agreement. These agreements constitute a type of regional 
cooperation, but to claim that these three countries, the primary sources of recent asylum claims in the 
United States, are safe according to the statutory standards is, on its face, highly dubious. Nevertheless, 
the statute imposes strong limits on judicial review. INA § 208(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3). It is too early 
to know how extensively these agreements will be used and whether they might largely replace the 
“Remain in Mexico” procedure. 
 74. Lind, supra note 73. For more on metering, see generally Al Otro Lado v. Wolf, 952 F.3d 999 
(2020). 
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statutes and international treaty commitments. The Supreme Court has 
stayed the injunction pending final appeals, which probably will not 
be resolved before 2021.75 Since its inception, the Remain in Mexico 
policy has expanded to more border cities, and as of March 2020, over 
60,000 people find themselves in that pipeline.76 
The basic concept could perhaps be defended, if implemented in 
good faith. But current implementation is marked by shortcuts in the 
three areas highlighted above: housing, procedures, and legal 
assistance.77 Under the Administration’s approach to operations, there 
are no systematic arrangements for housing within Mexico, much less 
for lodging funded by the United States. Many waiting families survive 
in tent cities or flimsy shelters, with limited access to social services 
or schooling. No reliable notification system exists to tell them when 
their U.S. cases are scheduled or rescheduled. Attorneys who would 
like to help in preparing a U.S. asylum claim face enormous practical 
obstacles. And the border regions where asylum seekers wait are prime 
operating ground for violent Mexican cartels. Migrants have become 
frequent victims of crime—both petty and violent.78 In actual 
operation so far, Remain in Mexico serves mainly to multiply 
hardships in order to discourage asylum seekers. 
It doesn’t have to be that way. Each of the negative features I just 
listed could be fixed by an enlightened executive. Or attention could 
instead shift to a system like what I sketched earlier, with adjudications 
done at refugee processing centers inside the United States or, 
alternatively, done on a multilateral basis in the region, producing 
resettlement shared among nearby countries. 
                                                                                                             
 75. Wolf v. Innovation Law Lab, No. 19A960, 2020 WL 1161432, at *1 (U.S. Mar. 11, 2020) (staying 
injunction issued in Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 1073, 1095 (9th Cir. 2020)). For a broader 
description, see Nicole Narea, The Supreme Court Just Allowed Trump to Continue Sending Migrants 
Back to Mexico, VOX (Mar. 11, 2020, 2:59 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/2/28/20907053/remain-in-
mexico-mpp-supreme-court-opinion [https://perma.cc/2PXL-AGFT]. 
 76. Narea, supra note 75. 
 77. See Forlorn Anniversary, supra note 69 (describing these impacts). 
 78. Marking One Year of the Horrific “Remain in Mexico” Policy – Over 800 Violent Attacks on 
Asylum-Seekers, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-
release/marking-one-year-horrific-remain-mexico-policy-over-800-violent-attacks-asylum-seekers 
[https://perma.cc/4L38-NC28]. 
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Regional cooperation can be made to work not as a way to impose 
hardships and merely discourage asylum seekers, but as a way to 
manage the logistics of a serious legal system. The objective is to 
afford protection where merited, but in a manner less subject to delay 
and manipulation—less likely to excite public backlash or provide red 
meat to extremist parties out to build “illiberal democracies.” 
We need to think in systemic ways about asylum, not only about 
individual cases.  Haven for refugees is an integral part of America’s 
history. Our task—all of ours—is to optimize welcome by giving due 
attention to the public’s impulse to control. Taming asylum is an 
indispensable part of taming immigration. 
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